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Abstract
The paper deals with the policies for an idealized transition of a National System of
Innovation (NSI) from a system reflecting a relatively closed industrializing economy to an
NSI which reflects the conditions of a well-developed "Information Society" and "Learning
Economy". The analysis of the transition process analyse the NSI from the viewpoint of the
needs of the existing firms of the business sector. The problem is how different types of
industrial and technology policy may help the business-oriented restructuring of the NSI.
The policies are: horizontal support for R & D of advanced firms; SME schemes for laggard
firms, etc.; new institutions and organizations for the cooperative production of new
technological inputs, such as customized chips; proactive diffusion policies; and market
building. It is suggested that policies should initially contribute to the self-organised
restructuring of advanced enterprises. On the basis is this preliminary change in the NSI it is
possible to turn  promoting the restructuring of imitators and laggards which have less
awareness and fewer absorbtion capabilities of the new technological input. The goal is to
generate a cumulative learning processes about restructuring which benefit both the firms
receiving support and other less advanced firms. In the implementation of the policies it is
important to recognize the time dependence (need to exploit the learning potential from
advanced firm restructuring; and the need to assure sufficiently strong system effects).
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Preface
We are quite happy to integrate international scholars in the DRUID network and to publish
their contributions in the DRUID working paper series. Especially when their contributions
are central for the themes of research around which our programme of research is built. This
paper gives an interesting contribution to the analysis of national systems of innovation
(Theme C).  Morris Teubal has been a guest professor at Aalborg University for a period in
1996 and participated in several of the DRUID-conferences.
In this paper Morris Teubal develops a new perspective on technology policy where the
focus is upon the transition of a national system of innovation and policy developments are
related to the different stages in such a transition. The paper is still in the form of a rather
sketchy and complex taxonomy. But it is imaginative and we believe it gives stimulus for
moving the debate further ahead in this important field of research.
Bengt-Åke Lundvall89
Restructuring and Embeddeness
Of Business Enterprises -Towards An Innovation System
Perspective On Diffusion Policy
Morris Teubal
1
The long term research objective of the topic of this paper is to apply the National Systems
of Innovation framework (Nelson 1993; Lundvall 1992, Edquist 1997) to analyze the
transition of economies to what can be termed the Information Society or a Learning
Economy. The starting point is the appreciative theory framework of analysis developed in
Galli-Teubal (1995) and Anderson-Teubal (in process) with its focus on Business Sector
Restructuring (RBS) and the impact on this process of increasingly wide and more complex
subsystems generated during NSI transition. Thus, “system effects” are being visualized in
these papers as potentially playing critical roles in the process of enterprise restructuring
required by the challenges of globalization and liberalization on the one hand and by the
implications of the technological revolution on the other.
The objective of this paper is to further analyze the process while modifying somewhat
both the focus and the overall framework of analysis. As with previous work I adopt a
systems focus  which means I will be considering both the direct effects of policies directed
to RBS as well as other policies which only have an indirect impact (‘system effects’) on
such a process. A major thrust in the latter will be to analyze the process (and nature) of
successfully “embedding” the Business Sector into a broader subsystem involving greater
complexity, a process which may contribute to successful RBS. In prior work this involved-
beyond a first phase of autonomous restructuring- a second phase involving the generation
of a new hierarchical level to the subsystem, one populated by more complex entitites-
collective organizations which were termed Technology Centers (TC’s). This paper further
develops these while also considering other changes in the nature of the more open, complex
and linked innovation system which is being generated in the wake of changes in the
environment (and of ‘BS embeddedness’ in this system). It also analyzes the ‘ideal’ role of a
                                                
1 This paper has benefited from extensive discussions with E. Andersen and K. Smith and from comments by
B. Johnson, D. Foray and F. Malerba. It was configured and in part written while the author visited Aalborg
University(Department of Business Studies), the STEP-Group, and PREST. Thanks to these institutions
and to the Jerusalem Institute  for continued financial support.10
broader set of policies or policy categories than that which has been usual in the past in
analyses of this kind. This in my opinion permits further specification of the policy
requirements for successful innovation system transition.Subsequent work will apply this
framework to explicitely consider transitions to an Information Society (e.g. as described in
EC 1996; OECD 1996).
In previous work we used the notion of Anticipated Institutional Change (AIC) to represent
the package of policies leading to the establishment of TC’s
2. The package includes both
changes in institutions, facilitation of enterprise coordination, stimulating the establishment
of new technological infrastructures which are critical for RBS, and other activities up to
initial diffusion of the novel technological services flowing from the new infrastructure.These
are supposed to generate the above-mentioned “(hierarchical) system effects” which could
help the autonomous efforts of the business sector to initiate and sustain its own
restructuring.
3  In our more complex policy framework AIC will continue to play a very
important role although other policies and aspects of embeddement will be considered as
well. First, policies directly oriented to promote RBS - in this paper these will be
Horizontal Policies (Teubal 1996a,7) which could trigger a collective, cumulative process of
learning  how to  effectively implement a restructuring process. Second, the higher
hierarchical level will eventually metamorphose from a TC to a market for novel
technological inputs which are considered central to the restructuring process
4. This process
will be important for materializinig a wider diffusion of business sector restructuring (ie.
beyond initiators and imitators). Finally, the rich set of policies and their phasing generate a
                                                
2 The term TC (Technology Center) in this paper expresses the organizational outcome of a process of
coordination and cooperation among firms whose objective is the generation of new technological capabilities
relevant for the restructuring needs of the Business Sector. They are an example of “Basic Tecnological
Infrastucture”(Justman & Teubal 1995). The Governement does not own the TC--it is not a Government
Laboratory-- nor is it the central actor in the process of its creation. It essentially is a facilitator of  the
process.
3 Since these policies do not involve directly stimuli or incentives towards business enterprises they are
referred to as ‘indirect’ policies i.e. working through system effects harnessed through the creation of a
second hierarchical level to the NSI. Building the new NIS could also be visualized as generating a new
”level playing field” for the business sector i.e. creating the conditions for everyone to be able to compete
without  discriminating unnecessarily between large and small firms,  foreign and domestic etc. This does
not mean that some types of firms will not have an advantage over others in the new system nor that the
process of selection could not lead to a large number of enterprise failure.
4 Alternatively, we may say that this new level involves at least one phase leading to a TC  and another one
involving a reconfiguration of the TC in parallell with building a new market for the novel technological
input. The phases in this paper would represent sub-phases of Galli & Teubal’s first phase of NIS transition
a fact which also entails a further specification of the processes taking place in such a phase (That paper has
also a third phase-ignored here- which involves creating links between a University sector and the recently
restructured Business Sector).11
new set of policy coordination, coherence and timing issues and thereby help unravel and
make more explicit a number of critical dimensions and assumptions underlying an
appropiate policy framework for Innovation System (IS) transition
5. One potentially
interesting implication concerns the nature and role of broad, horizontal policies in RBS and
the balance between these and targeted & technology specific policies in NIS transition, a
major issue in Diffusion Policies.
6 In the conceptual model that follows targeted policies will
play an important role even though we largely ignore explicit interfirm differences in sector
and in technologies.
2. The Nature of Business Sector Restructuring
Enterprise restructuring in response to changes in the external or internal environment of the
Business Enterprise sector e.g. liberalization\ globalization  and new technological
opportunities , could involve one or more of the following aspects-
·  product specialization, adoption of new technologies  and enhanced world market
orientation
·  introduction of new functions( e.g. R&D, search) and associated routines(Teubal
1996,1997)
·  organizational innovations such as Just in Time, Total Quality Management(Ishikawa
1985) , Business Process Re-engineering(Hammer & Champy 1993), Down(right)sizing,
and Innovation Management Techniques(Green Paper 1996)
·  collaborative structures, enterprise networking and links between enterprises and among
these and other organizations \ institutions(for a summary  of trends see Galli & Teubal
1997)
·  shift to precision manufacturing and\or introduction of the ‘design’ function
·  development of distinct dynamic capabilities(Teece & Pisano 1994, Teece et al 1995,
Prahalad & Hammer 1990)
                                                
5 In principle the framework can also be extended to consider the policy implications of the potentially
deleterious effects of IT such as social exclusion and unemployment. Future work will more explicitely deal
with this issue (It will have to consider not only incumbent firms but also new firms and individuals).
6 See for example Soete and Arundel (1993). These authors use the terms general\specific to describe diffusion
policies rather than horizontal\targeted policies as used here within a NIS perspective.12
·  Adoption of Information technologies  together with enhanced training of employees,
adoption of team-based incentives and enhanced employment of skilled personell(E.
Brynjolfsson 1996, Bresnahan 1996); etc
This is not a complete list nor are all items completely independent of others.Some may be
relevant for  the restructuring of some firms at certain times, others for other firms at other
times. Not all firms attempt to restructure “to harness the forces of globalization,
deregulation, technology or demographics...”(Hamer and Pralahad 1994,  chapter 12) and not
all attempts to do so are successful. My objective here is not to survey the extensive
literature on the various aspects of restructuring but rather to provide a broad overview to
the type of changes I have in mind.
I implicitely assume firm heterorgeneity at least in the sense that different groups of firms
will restructure at different times and in connection with a different subset of restructuring
components. Their decision will not only depend on the information they exogenously have
but also on processes of learning to restructure  the knowledge of which will flow from
advanced or innovator firms(who restructure early) to imitator and laggard fims.
Most of the aspects of restructuring are implicit in the model--these are termed general; their
implementation  can be visualized as depending on the knowledge and experience of
enterprises including experience from others. Many of the organizational innovations and the
introduction of new management routines seems to belong to this category. Full restructuring
of any enterprise, however, is assumed in this paper to depend also on a specific aspect
which involves the effective incorporation of a new (technological) input or new
technological services into the organization.This aspect is extensively discussed and made
explicit in the paper(esp. section 3).The new inputs  are provided  by the newly created TC
rather than from imports since a necessary condition is geographical proximity of the source
of supply. This is justified in terms of the need for user-supplyer interactions, provison of
close technical support  and customized adaptation of the good or service which is both
novel to the economy and  relatively complex as far as effective adoption is concerned.
The new technological input is assumed to be required for the restructuring of  all
enterprises-although in different configurations. In this sense it is of strategic importance for
the economy and therefore some measure of policy targeting of the supply and diffusion of13
this input is inevitable.The input can be visualized as  specialized measurement or design
services which would enable, together with more general organizational changes, propel firms
to introduce ‘precision manufacturing’ or to be involved in ‘product design’ .
7
The above assumptions implies that it makes sense to talk about a cumulative  process  of
learning to restructure   since whatever the differences among enterprises concerning the
general aspects, they always will confront a common problem of tackling with the specific
aspect of restructuring. In terms of ‘diffusion processes’ the specific aspect involves
directly the diffusion of ‘artifacts’ whereas all  aspects of restructuring-both general and
specific-also involve diffusion of knowledge(and \ or skills -see Metcalfe 1988).
Horizontal sharing of Information \ knowledge
Numerous examples could be found about horizontal sharing(e.g. due to networking) and
horizontal transmission (also beyond networks) of experience, information and knowledge
that occurs in the wake of liberalization of trade, globalization, etc and of the resulting
restructuring process just mentioned. (‘Horizontal’ sharing here refers to sharing by firms
who belong to different sectors ) Examples are experience about how to  search for an
appropiate new and a more focused specialization pattern(external consultants here may
play an important role in this diffusion process); general knowledge \ experience about
foreign markets and how to do business in these markets;  knowledge about the new
management and organizational routines required for R&D (or more complex forms of
R&D); and experience from introducing and implementing  new organizational
technologies(e.g  the  experience of Xerox in ‘benchmarking’  and of  Kodak, GE, Rover &
British Airways  in introducing TQM was important for other firms that came afterwards
see Garvin 1993, C.Carr 1996 and C. Wick &Stanton Leon 1993). In the context of this
paper these ‘diffusion’ processes  pertain to the broad aspects or dimensions of enterprise
restructuring.  At the early stages of a successful restructuring process significant flows (and
                                                
7 I mentioned that the TC represents a new hierarchical level of the evolving National System of Innovation.
More generally this new hierarchical level would comprise both collective organizations\ institutions and
markets linked with the provision of new restructuring-relevant technologies whether or not they are related
to the shift to precision manufacturing. These technologies could include new design technologies, flexible
manufacturing and new organizational\managerial techniques and processes. Not all of the requirements for
restructuring involve actors or institutions belonging to the second hierarchical level of the innovation
system. The assumption made here however is that some critical ones do. For a discussion of what
constitutes a new hierarchical level, see Andersen and Teubal op. cit.14
horizontal sharing)  of information & experience about the above and about the various
components of restructuring is likely to take place. Moreover, I submit that it is likely that
consolidation of the above into a cumulative process of collective learning  about
restructuring has probably taken place in economies with successful BS restructuring
8
The upshot is that enterprise restructuring could be a collective learning process of the
business sector which is both cause and effect of successful National Innovation System
transition. Restructuring should be viewed as a diffusion process not only of organizational
innovations but also  of knowledge & skills related both to artifacts&organization and to
other general aspects of restructuring.
3. Towards the ‘Systems’ Embeddement of the business sector-a Simple
Model
3.1 The issues
Business Sector restructuring depends ultimately on decisions of individual enterprises, but
these are taken within framework conditions which include both the structure of the wider
system in which they operate and government policies - both macro and meso\micro
policies. The feasability and profitability of restructuring, therefore, also depend on factors
that trascend the scope and ‘direct’ efficiency of the restructuring efforts of individual
enterprises even those efforts which are affected by the experience and knowledge received
from other firms. They will also depend both on incentives & other policy actions and on
‘second level’ organizations, institutions and even firms which both incumbents and
government may be instrumental in bringing about.
Assume that a relatively small group of firms - advanced or ‘Schumpeterian’ entrepreneurs -
will autonomously initiate restructuring before adaptations have taken place in the wider
system and in policy. These firms may play a crucial role in NSI transition since--as
described above-- they may induce collective learning and set in motion a cumulative process
                                                
8 Government agencies implementing horizontal restructuring policies (HRP)  to stimulate such restructuring
may play an important role in generating this cumulative, experience - based, process through the creation of
a ‘policy implementation network’ (Teubal 1997). It must be noted that the emphasis of this paper on these
(horizontal) effects which straddle accross sectors dovetails well with abscence of explicit  intersectorial
differences. Despite this restriction other sources of enterprise heterogeneity are considered in this paper.15
of restructuring in the sector
9 
10. However, as suggested above, in a wide variety of
circumstances the possibility and strength of the cumulative process that follows
autonomous restructuring may critically depend on embedding the BS into a more complex
system involving higher hierarchical levels In the abscence of such an embeddement it may
be that a large segment of firms will not restructure or will not do it effectively
11. This
because of market failure, institutional constraints and abscence of sufficiently strong
‘system effects’ (System Failures). For example, non-availability in the geographical and
cultural neighbourhood of these firms of new intermediate organizations or linking agents
with whom to interact, learn and purchase new technological inputs may block the effective
completion of restructuring even by relatively capable entrepreneurs. It may also block the
introduction of the organizational changes which accompany and even constitute a central
aspect of such restructuring.
12 The outcome might be a weak process of ‘follow-up‘
restructuring ie. that following the autonomous restructuring process, and a trunkated
transition of the innovation system (Anderson and Teubal).
While existing work suggests the potential importance of “embeddeness” the process is not a
simple one and involves much more than supply-push type actions. Effective embeddedness
depends on a complex set of institutional changes and investments in new technological
infrastructures as well as in diffusion of novel technological services and possibly market
building.
13 It follows that an orchestrated and coordinated set of policy measures is required
                                                
9 An interesting real world counterpart to the advanced firms segment could be the Japanese automobile
assembling plants established in the UK during the last 10 years. Nissan and other producers (Toyota,
Honda) spurred a revolution in other segments of the manufacturing sector by spearheading the introduction
of new organizational and management techniques linked with three areas: a commitment to continuos
improvement  (Kaizen); cooperative relationships between workers, managers and supplyers; and pervasive
measurement of all aspects of business (to identify both serious faults and what precisely needs
improvement). The “restructuring” impact included an enormous increase in quality standards of supplyers
(e.g. Lucas and GKN) and “horizontal” diffusion of such innovations to other companies such as Ford and
Rover. See Financial Times (1996).
10 The collective learning process which took place was not limited to the motor industry. ”Managers from all
over the country flocked to Sunderland to visit the plant ...The Government has sponsosred teams of experts
to learn from Nissan and other Japanese carmaker (Financial Times, op. cit).
11 Despite the important cumulative diffusion effects described above there still exists “a long tail of
underperforming  smaller companies”. Moreover, “supplyers to UK car plants (with some exceptions) do
not match the world’s best.
12 There is a vast literature on the relationship between technical and organizational change starting with
Schumpeter himself. For recent work on how one type affects the other and\or the need of coordinated and
complementary changes see  Bresnahan 1996, and E. Brynjolfsson 1996. Despite ample recognition of this
link little seems to have been said in the literature on the potential policy implications of this relationship.
13 The importance of providing external advice to SME’s and of developing ‘markets’ for such services is well
acknowledged (Vickery 1996) and embodied in Government Programs e.g. the EU’s Innovation
Management Techniques support program.16
not only to generate qualitatively new links among enterprises and between them and other
agents and actors of the economy; but to create wholly new markets as well.
It is worth noting that the importance of the ‘embeddeness issue’ and of associated system
effects might be even greater for transition of the innovation system towards a Learning
Economy. This because of the skewed effects of IT: on the one hand it offers new
opportunities for advanced entrepreneurs; on the other it may have a tendency to create new
problems  due to the fact that substantial numbers of firms (including SME’s), other
organizations and regions could significantly lag in the adoption of the new technologies.
Similarly with individuals in connection with the opportunities and threats opened up by IT
relative to their level of skills. Thus the new technologies may lead to serious problems of
social exclusion, lack of regional cohesion, and unemployment (see Wolff 1996,
Papaconstantinou & Colecchia  1996; EC & OECD op. cit).
It follows that explicit attempts at strongly inducing restructuring of potentially fast learners
within the less privileged segments of the business sector (and of individuals & society at
large) should also play a central role in NIS transition, one that may be the key for high
productivity, low unemployment and a lower level of social exclusion in Europe. This will
tend to increase the importance of embedding the business sector into an even wider system
while raising similar issues viz a viz individuals.The boundaries of the relevant Innovation
System will also tend to be broader than otherwise, since not solving the social problem
today may not make the system transition a sustainable one in the future.
3.2 Framework of Analysis and Restructuring Phases
The analysis of business sector restructuring focuses on the specific dimension which
involves absortion within firms of novel technological inputs or services, previously not
available in the economy. More specifically, assumptions are made about the extent by
which firms are aware, have articulated their need, and are capable of absorbing the new
input-conditions for shifting to the precision manufacturing configuration demanded by
world markets.
14
                                                
14 Supply considerations for these inputs will be considered as well.17
Three phases of restructuring are considered. Initial restructuring of the business sector takes
place in the first phase; while emergence of a Technology Center supplying novel
technological services (a critical aspect of restructuring) and of a Market for such services
will occur in Phases 2 and 3 respectively
15. The latter two phases involve embedding the
enterprises of the business sector into a wider NSI involving the second hierarchical level
previously mentioned, whose ‘system effects’ if strong enough could pull the whole
business sector through the process of restructuring. All three phases are assumed to be
necessary for a successful transition of the NSI.
The business sector is composed mostly of incumbent firms there is only marginal creation
of new firms supplying the novel technological services (in Phase 3 of the transition
process)  and  other consultancies supporting the restructuring of laggard firms. But there is
no widespread creation of new firms. Incumbent firms comprise three groups: advanced
firms; potential initators and laggards (a further distinction between ‘mild’ and ‘severe’
laggards will be introduced later on). Advanced firms will restructure in Phase 1 while
imitators and laggards will -under a complete NSI trajectory-restructure in Phases 2 and 3
respectively. For our purposes here we assume-despite some other implicit distinctions -
that there are no other differences among firms in the Business Sector which have to be made
explicit e.g. according to economic sector, industrial branch or technology\markets.
16
Phase 1
A1) A small segment of advanced firms perceive or anticipate the changes in the
environment and will autonomously initiate the restructuring process. While Horizontal
Restructuring Policies could be implemented to reinforce the broad dimension of advanced
firms’ restructuring, these firms must posess capabilities for undertaking such a process
(specific dimension)-- despite the fact that the new technological inputs are not yet readily
                                                
15 I already mentioned that Technology Centers are viewed here as resulting, in the first instance, from a
Coasian process i.e. coordinated actions of advanced firms to build private institutions\organizations to
internalize external economies. AIC would still be required to enable or facilitate the process (like in the
Swiss and Japanese cases as argued by Weder and Grubel, 1994). The proactiveness and catalytic
subsidization of AIC policies may have to be stronger, however, if advanced entrepreneurs are few or if their
disposition or capacity for cooperation is weak. Thus promoting new institutions \organizations is
complementary to public subsidization i.e. they are not only nor always substitutes.
16 Subsequent work will attempt at integrating this kind of analysis which is essentially ‘institutional
oriented’ to the ‘technological regimes’ and ‘technology systems’ literature (see B. Carlsson 1996 and F.
Malerba & Orsenigo 1996).18
available in the economy. It follows that these firms will be finding make-shift and imperfect
solutions to their precision manufacturing needs--either  in-house production or from
external sources;
A2) Completion (or deepening) of the process will depend on availability of the new inputs
which-due to economies of scope- will depend on creation of a technological center(TC)
17;
A3)  Some  Schumpeterian entrepreneurs also have the disposition and capability to
cooperate  among  themselves to create such a center, but this will not be sufficient due to
institutional obstacles and market failure;
A4) The timely implementation of Anticipated Institutional Change by the Government
may lead to the creation of a TC. AIC will include changes in institutions, helping the
coordination of private sector efforts, identifiying and providing incentives to the
establishment of new Technological Infrastructures which will generate the new required
technological services; etc (see Galli &Teubal op.cit.). I assume that such an intervention will
be forthcoming;
A5) Potential imititators and laggard firms initially posess a lower degree of ‘felt need’
concerning restructuring and also weaker capabilities (throughout) for undertaking the
process and in particular for accessing and effectively utilizing the novel technological
services required. A necessary but not always sufficient condition for overcoming such




A6) Experience with the restructuring of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs may generate a body
of collective knowledge about restrucuring which may enhance awareness and perceived need
about restructuring among the imitator population of firms. Refocused Horizontal Policies
promoting restructuring will enhance both the experience obtained and its codification into a
more systematic and accessible fund of knowledge.
                                                
17 Alternatively we may consider a two stage restructuring process-the first where cost is high and the second
when it declines due to ready availability of the input from the collective organization.
18 This paper assumes a policy subsystem which is both forward looking amd sufficiently responsive to
emerging Business Sector needs. It should also posess capabilities for effectively designing and
implementing relevant new policies.  19
A7) However, due to weak restructuring capabilities, implementation of such restructuring is
not automatic even after TC creation when the novel technological services may be offered
for sale.
A8) More specifically it is assumed that a proactive diffusion policy should be implemented
by the TC (probably backed up by Government incentives) in order to promote diffusion of
the inputs to potential imitators. Proactive diffusion implies specific attempts at generating
awareness and significant efforts at understanding the ‘what’  and the ‘why’ concerning the
user needs of various categories of enterprises. It also could involve at attempts at  codifying
such  knowledge-  especially about the interface between the new technological service
configurations and the different types of users
19 - and provision of ample technical back up
to the transactions involved. Proactive diffusion policies will, therefore, contribute to
building “demand” for the services on the part of potential imitators.
Phase 3
A9) While past  experience  with restructuring could contribute in a limited way to the
awareness and capabilities of laggards, it is not sufficient to assure successful diffusion of
restructuring among  this (probably dominant) segment of firms. Nor will a simple
continuation of the proactive diffusion policies succesfully implemented in Phase 2 suffice;
A10) Non-automaticity of the diffusion process throught the large and (potentially-as far as
adoption behaviour is concerned) varied population of of  ‘laggard’ enterprises during phase
3, due to remaining ‘demand’ and ‘capability’ constraints, together with general efficiency
considerations, justify attempts at creating an “organized market” (Lundvall 1985) for the
novel technological input (x). Such a market will endogeneize the process, but policies are
required both to build the market and to assure that it promotes wide diffusion of the input.
Market building policies should ideally be undertaken by the TC who in the process might
have to be downsized.
20 They will involve a continuation of policies for building demand
which were undertaken in previous phases (“proactive diffusion policies”) to which will
now be added   policies to create new supply  agents e.g. through the training of consultants
and even transfer of bits of the infrastructure to private laboratories. These measures, even if
                                                
19 We assume that such differences exist but are not made explicit in our appreciative theory excercise.20
successful, are unlikely to promote diffusion to all  members of the relevant segement of
laggard enterprises(they may take care of  ‘mild’ laggards but will be insufficient for the
restructuring needs of ‘severe’ laggards);
A11) For ‘severe’ laggards proactive diffusion by a reconfigured and probably down-sized
TC may have to be continued. Moreover, all laggards will require complementary SME -
support policies. These may include training policies, general SME management support
schemes, and creation of an organizational\management\technological consultancy segment of
specialized firms.
21
A summary of the demand and supply situation with respect to the new input x (which was
assumed to be an essential ingredient in the restructuring process) is shown in Table 1.
Following our previous description a clear distinction is made between the situation facing
the three segments of the Business Sector during the phase in which they are initiating their
restructuring process. Such phases are shown in colunm 1: the first entry corresponds to
advanced firms and to  phase 1 (since restructuring of such segment occurs in this phase);
etc. Table 2 summarizes the capacity to access and use the novel input x on the part of the
corresponding enterprise segment. This capacity is only partial for imitators and laggards (in
phases 2 and 3 respectively). The insufficiency occurs despite the fact that a Techological
Center has arisen which supplies the input at the beggining of phase 2 (thus making it easier
for imitators to access\use the input and to undertake the restructuring) while a full market
for the input has emerged at the beggining of phase 3 which would further pave the way for
firms to incorporate the input. The fact that, despite these constraints, imitators do
undertake restructuring in phase 2 and laggards in phase 3 is due to Government Policy
(including the policy of the TC) -which is also briefly described in Table 2.
                                                                                                                                                     
20 This raises issues concerning the incentives of the TC to promote market building , see Justman & Teubal
op. cit
21 The policies undertaken will affect the selection process operating within the Business Sector. The new
opportunities to absorb the new inputs and to undertake restructuring  should not weaken the overall
selection environment, only make it more efficient by creating a new  ‘level playing field’.The scope of
‘slow-learner’ exit is   a policy decision which should consider broader national objectives including issues
of cohesion,(thkus the task of policy goes beyond the timely creation of the more complex system of
innovation).  Note that the  initial gaps in the support system and abscence of adequate enterprise
embeddement (“system failures”) imply that  the market selection mechanism may be inadequate by itself to
perform  the job. Market selection may be much more effective after enterprise embeddement has taken
place(but as we have seen, it need not be the only criterion for selection undeer the new  system of
innovation).21
While a full discussion of policy follows in the next section, note in Table 3 the sequence of
policies supporting a full process of BS restructuring (and NSI transition). All phases
involve both Horizontal and Targeted policies. Figure 1 summarizes a successful process of
RBS. Before explaining it fully we should indroduce the notion of “dynamic factor” and
discuss policy issues more systematically than what was done until now.22
Table 1: SUPPLY & DEMAND AND ABILITY TO USE
FOR THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL INPUT (x)
Enterprise Segment D: Demand
     A: Ability to use
Supply




A: full ability (also if in house
substitutes)
a) Initially only available
from in house effort
b) available from TC
I-Potential Imitators
(phase 2)
D: awareness and partial








D: some awareness of need
(learning from others)
A: partial ability
no awareness nor articulation
of need
A: a weak ability




Table 2: BUSINESS SECTOR RESTRUCTURING (R):
CAPACITY TO ACCESS & USE NEW INPUT (X) AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A  -Advanced Firms        (Phase 1)
Capabilities
1a) capacity to initiate R with imperfect, in-house, substitutes; and a capability to organize
cooperative & coordinated action to create a TC (necessary but not sufficient for emergence
of TC).
1b)  capacity to complete R (after establishment of TC and availability of x)
Policy Implications
1a) Horizontal Restructuring Policies (HRP) to strengthen autonomous R and to generate
collective learning (non-targeted but aimed at Advanced firms)
1b) Targeted Anticipated Institutional Change (AIC): changes in the institutional framework,
coordination efforts, identification and support of relevant new Technological
Infrastructures and stimulating establishment of a TC.
I - Potential Imitators       (Phase 2)
Capabilities
Given X from the TC, only a partial capability to absorb the new input and undertake
restructuring due to weak technical skills and insufficient ability to articulate or translate specific
R needs in terms of the new input.
Policy Implications
Continuation of HRP with a new focus aimed at imitators rather than  advanced firms.
Targeted pro-active diffusion policies- strong technical back-up to sales and systematic attempts
at building demand (by TC)
Targeted Market Building Policies (continuation by TC of demand creation policies and
initiation of supply building policies)
L - Laggards               (Phase 3)
Capabilities
mild L: Given the market for X, a partial capability to restructure due to weak skills and 
abscence of organizational capabilities
severe L: Extremely weak capabilities.
Policy Implications
An SME- support scheme (instead of a HRP).
Continuation of proactive diffusion by (reconfigured) TC for those firms not effectively reached
by  market or by market with incentives.24





1 HRP, AIC* networking networking
2 endogeneous R HRP, MB* PD* networking
3 endogeneous R endogeneous R SME, PD*
endogeneous R endogeneous R endogeneous
Symbols
HRP: Horizontal Restructuring Policies;
AIC:  Anticipated Institutional Change
PD:  Proactive Diffusion Policies;
MB: Market Building;
SME: SME-support scheme.
*: indicates trageted policies.
A: Advanced;
I: Imitator;
         L: Laggard25
3.3 Conceptual Clarifications
Key Sector Alternative to a TC
An alternative to a TC is a set of new firms supplying novel technological inputs following a
pattern similar to Rosenberg’s Key Sector (Rosenberg 1962). In our context, these firms
could be involved in specialized chip design and batch production services; in novel
technological services associated with precision\quality production; in software & new
communication services and products, etc. Frequently, full fledged markets may develop in
some of these new products. It should be noted that the relevance of the key sector concept
goes beyond the machine tool industry studied by Rosenberg (see data in Patel & Pavitt
1994). Such sectors would belong to the category of ‘specialized supplyers’ within the
overall taxonomy put forth by Pavitt (1984) provided that they involve new ‘generic’ inputs
as well. I will be assuming that at least a subset of important inputs of such nature could
develop into relatively well functioning markets.
The key sector may result from the process of vertical desintegration within incumbent
firms (Andersen & Teubal op.cit.). In this case it still may be useful to consider a distinction
between an initial diffusion process comprising Phase 2 from emergence of a full fledged
market for the new, generic, type of input in Phase 3.Rather than having a collective
organization being involved in initial activities (technology transfer and absortion from
abroad; and initial diffusion) we would now have one or a small number of innovator firms
launching the new inputs and, with the help of user feedbacks, initiating the process of
applying the new technology. The subsequent market building phase would simply be
represented by the take-off of the new technology in the wake of convergence to some kind
of standardization or even dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback 1977). Explicit
supply based policies, such as those undertaken by the TC (training of existing
consultancies; spinoffs from TC personnel, etc), would not be undertken by firms-since this26
would normally mean creating new competitors
22. But building of demand would still be a
central aspect of firm strategy.
23
Policies may still be required for both of these phases. For example, enabling or facilitating
coordination of the processes of backward desintegration which may lead to the
establishment of new input supplyers (see Andersen and Lundvall 1995); and compensating
for market failure which may be rampant at the initial phases of development of new key
firms and the new generic technologies which they develop and diffuse (see also Teubal
op.cit.)
Coordinated Building of Supply and Demand
Successful restructuring involves the coordinated building of demand and of supply for new
technological services. The problem is not only that of coordinating supply and demand; it is
of building both in a phased and coordinated way.
During phase 1 the autonomous initiation of restructuring involves or leads to emergence of a
demand for such services. Due to economies of scope in new capability development (or in
the absortion of such capabilities from abroad) the appropiate and cost effective  type of
supply response is, very likely, not inmediately available. This because such a response
may have to overcome market failures and other obstacles associated with the collective
effort to create the (local or semipublic) goods. It will take time and may also require
Government assistance. Thus at sub-phase 1a supply adaptation takes place at the
individual firm level where makeshift solutions are sought. But this is not an appropiate
adaptation in the long run which requires collective generation of the new capabilities in
order to exploit economies of scope( a TC enables precisely this). For this to happen in a
timely fashion (sub-phase 1b), AIC may be crucial. Note that the disparity between supply
and demand may temporarily increase once AIC is activated--since expectations of timely
                                                
22 Despite this firm cooperation -even among competitors- at the early stages of new market development, is
common and may be important for the future development of the industry (See Langlois 1992 for an analysis
of the early development of the PC industry). It is even conceivable that additional entrants may contribute
to building the overall market for incumbent firms (a possible example is the case of laser based eye
operation systems).
23 Key to market building by fims might be that the initiator\innovator key firms create a user-producer
network while serving as the central node of this network (a PBX in the parlance of Teubal et al 1991). For
different configurations of market building under different assumptions about interactions and innovation see
Teubal & Zuscovich 1996.27
supply of inputs, with appropiate configurations and low cost, will reinforce the
restructuring efforts of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs(Galli & Teubal op.cit).
Elimination of the above mentioned supply bottleneck through creation of a TC, will, in our
model, generate a demand bottleneck. This because the new services are now available at
marginal cost to all firms,not only the advanced ones. However creation of demand need not
be an automatic process and not all firms are aware of their needs for the input (laggards) or
even if they were, are capable of accessing them and utilizing them for precision
manufacturing (potential imitators). Thus, the transition in Phase 2 and 3 could be
understood in terms of effectively creating a demand for (or eliminating excess supply of)
the new inputs which are critical for restructuring.
Policies may have to be implemented for this purpose. These should involve both horizontal
incentives to directly promote the general dimensions of restructuring-albeit with a different
focus and target population than those of phase 1-and a number of targeted policies. The
latter  involve  both proactive diffusion (which is a demand creating process which
accompanies sales and which also involves technical back-up) and market building policies,
both of which may be undertaken in a decentralized fashion by the TC
24. While the
proactive diffusion policies may be sufficient to initially ‘integrate’ potential imitators into
the new system, full-fledged market building and other policies may be required to make
their embeddeness automatic and long standing; as well as to contribute to embedding
laggards.
25
Dynamic Factors affecting the restructuring process
Dynamic Factors positively link agents’ actions or specific processes within early phases
with new opportunities facing other agents in later phases (They may also link processes
within a particular phase but this is ignored here). They are of two types: restructuring by
advanced firms generate experience and knowledge which enhance the capability of imitators
                                                
24 Governmemts may have to actively support TC’s in their market building process since such a social profit
perspective on the part of these organizations may imply incurring ‘private’ losses. See Justman and Teubal
1995.
25 Compared to Phase 2 an even more extreme and massive deficiency of demand could exists in phase 3.One
aspect of the solution already mentioned  is a new social institution--the market for the critical input. A
differentiated market (see Teubal & Zuscovitch, op cit) would support a set of specialized supplyers which
would be able to cater to the ongoing needs of various types of users. This would provide both breadth of
coverage, flexibility & adaptability to changes in technology and needs .28
and laggards to subsequently restructure; and new infrastructure, collective organizations and
social\other institutions of early phases will benefit agents in subsequent phases. The latter
include the TC which emerged in phase 1 and facilitated the restructuring of imitators in
phase 2 and, together with market building, that of laggards in phase 3
26.
The prescence of dynamic factors in the process of business sector restructuring is indicator
of a potential contribution to the economy; but they are not in themselves-with some
exceptions depending on valuation of capabilities in capital markets- a measured and
currently available (& fungible) addition to GNP or wealth. They create future options
whose impact will also depend on complementary policies and on pertinent behaviour by
new agents in the future. Despite some inherent poblems in evaluating “dynamic factors”
they should be taken into account and appropiate indicators should systematically be
collected.
Finally it may be worthwhile to mention that there is a dynamic role played by certain
players or actors at certain stages of NSI evolution. Thus advanced, Schumpeterian
entreprenuers play a such a role in two respects: they generate a fund of intangibles which is
useful for other firms that restructure in the future; and their cooperative efforts also
contribute to generate new technological infrastructure and organizational capital (as well as
partial absortion of overthead costs for the former) for future use. The second most
important dynamic role in our model is played by the collective organization stimulated by
advanced firms-the TC. Their proactive diffusion policies should play an important demand
creating role which will benefit phase 3 laggard firms which restructure. Such an activity in
Phase 2 also contributes to imitator restructuring and thereby also, indirectly, to the fund of
restructuring experience which imitators generate and which laggards may subsequently use.
                                                
26 A parallel may be found with dynamic aspects of growth and trade theory.Thus specialization according to
static comparative advantage may lead to a low-learning trajectory for the economy (see Teubal 1973 and
some of the contributions of the new growth theory such as Lucas (1993) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991). Alternatively,   specializing in high-learning sectors or activities may also be associated with
dynamic factors in this case a fund of intangibles and of ‘organizational capital’which potentially contributes
to future “production possilities” (and which are only imperfectly evaluated in the present). In contrast to
neoclassical or advanced neoclassical models where dynamic factors focus on technological intangibles or in
scale economies emerging in the process of “‘sectoral’ structural change” their role in NSI transition is to
generate “cumulativeness” of the process. This involves links among different types of firms and between
them and new institutions\organizations. Central to these are management and organizational routines. Note
that the emergence of dynamic factors, much more than in neoclassical models, is only a precondition of
cumulativeness.  29
4. Policy Issues and Policy Framework for Successful NSI transition
4.1 The set of policies and their deployment through time
The set of policies considered here includes the following elements:
* Horizontal Restructuring Policies (HRP)
* Anticipated Institutional Change (AIC)
* Proactive Diffusion Policies (by the TC)
* Market Building (by the TC)
* SME-support schemes.
Annex 1 presents summary descriptions of a possible functional content of each policy.
From the point of view of beneficiary firms, HRP are focused according to transition phase:
in phase 1- towards the restructuring needs of advanced entrepreneurs; in phase 2-to those
of imitators; and in phase 3-to the needs of laggards which means that the HRP is
transformed into an SME-support scheme (I assume that a dominant if not overwhelming
share of laggard enterprises are SME’s). Despite this focusing HRP are horizontal  in the
sense (i) that they are aimed at firms, according to general criteria, irrespective of industrial
branch or technology area or type (see Teubal 1997); and (ii) their objective is to provide
support for general aspects of restructuring such as the introduction of new managemet \
organizational routines  (e.g.  TQM) or  novel functions  of relevance to enterprise
restructuring such as R&D and associated routines; (iii) their objective is to generate a
collective learning process which exploits the commonalities of the experience with
restructuring accross industrial sectors \ types of technologies(Teubal 1996a,1997). On the
other hand AIC, proactive diffusion and Market Building policies are targeted policies in the
sense that they promote diffusion of the strategic new input or technology (“novel
technological services”) which policy makers, advanced firms and the TC (after its
inception)  have identified as being of critical importance for the restructuring needs of the
Business Sector as a whole.
27 This means that policy makers no less than responding to felt
                                                
27 In Andersen & Teubal op.cit. the targeted nature of AIC is discussed. In a multi sector setting were each
sector or group of firms requires a different type of new technological input it is possible to implement a30
needs of some firms also are anticipating the needs of others who presently cannot articulate
their restructuring needs
28 or who require technical back-up in order to access required new
technological inputs.
29
In Table 3 I summarize the deployment of policies at the various phases of the restructuring
processes and for the various business sector segments. The diagonal is the central focus of
the Table and its cells depict-- at each phase and for the business sector segment whose
restructuring is initiated then-- the set of horizontal and targeted policies implemented during
an ideal NSI transition. The policies in each cell of the diagonal, if successful in implementing
RBS of the relevant segment, influence the policies of the next cell. Moreover the targeted
ones (indicated by*) respond to a felt need by the relevant business sector segment (located
in the same cell) while at the same time anticipate the needs of firms belonging to a less
sophisticated segment of the business sector (located in the next cell in the diagonal in SE
direction).
Two additional aspects of Table 3 should be mentioned the first of which being policies
stimulating networking of imitators and laggards already in phase 1 (and also to laggards in
phase 2). This policy should be regarded as a preparatory type of policy which sets the
stage for full restructuring later on. It is information intensive & a low-budget policy. Its
main contribution would be to generate awareness of changes in the environment and
assurance of the possibility of change (e.g. by demonstration) as well as a mechanism for the
systematic collection of new, restructuring-relevant information. In the restricted sense given
                                                                                                                                                     
semihorizontal policy rather than a purely targeted policy that would stimulate different TC’s  and associated
technological infrastructures. The Government may announce that any group of firms who got their act
together would receive support (incentives, information, coordination, etc). Thus the Government need not
know what specific input types are required by each branch of the business sector. It would, however, have to
know about the broader general class of inputs to which each one of the specific types belong. Thus some
targeting or prioritization at a higher level of policy would still be required.
28 A clear distinction should be made between ‘general need’ and articulated need\demand for a particular new
product; and this can be applied to the issue of restructuring . The possibility of the former without the latter
has been pointed out in Teubal 1979 (‘low market\ need determinateness’) In our context this could mean a
very general awareness of the necessity of restructuring on the part of enterprises without a clear idea that this
implies the need to utilize and incorporate the strategic new technological input.
29 It may be worthwhile to clarify a number of points. First,  HRP while directly aimed at satisfying the ‘felt
need’ for restructuring on the part of some  business enterprises(the advanced or innovator segment) also
involves anticipation of needs (Teubal op.cit). Second, the distinction between horizontal and targeted
policies also corresponds to the distinction between the broad restructuring dimension and the specific one.
Third,  recent  work on horizontal programs shows that these do not necessarily imply neutrality in
incentives. Moreover, the learning processes involved during implementation (including enhanced
Government capabilities to identify and locate market failure) may transform an horizontal\neutral policy to a
set of semihorizontal and even targeted policies. Finally note that the SME- support scheme combines
horizontality with a strong demand-creating bias-a dimension which differentiates it,to some extent, from a
regular Horizontal Technology Policy (See Annex).31
here to the term ‘stimulating networking’, the policy promotes and generally provides for a
secretariat for a group of firms who are searching for such information e.g.about new markets
and new technology. If successful they may induce laggards (imitators) to move forward into
the imitator (advanced) category.Success of these policies has been recorded in contexts such
as Chile ( PROFO Programs) and Norway (private communication by K.Smith).
30
Second,  the table also indicates the phase when firms ‘endogenize’ their restructuring
process  e.g  beyond phase 3 for laggards. Finally, note that the policies correspond to the
initial conditions facing each segment at each phase I (Table 2). Initial conditions in phases 2
and 3 reflect the effect of the dynamic factors generated in phases 1 and 1, 2 respectively.
Figure 1 summarizes the RBS process under a full NSI transition. The horizontal axis
indicates time and the vertical one indicates the hierarchical level of the reconfigured NSI.
Thus at the first hierarchical level we observe a succession of restructuring processes starting
at Phase 1 with that of advanced firms (represented by Ra); and followed by Ri and Rl
(restructuring of imitators and then of laggards). At the second level establishment of TC
during sub-phase 1b and emergence of the new market M sometime during phase 2. The
dashed arrows show the direction of the dynamic factors with the horizontal ones at level 1
indicating the spillovers from advanced firms and the corresponding learning to restructure
by imitators & laggards. The remaining dashed arrows related more specifically to the
supply and demand for the new input x (represented by the full line straight arrows and the
notation S or D respectively). Thus Ra also contributes-through the demand for x and the
subsequent establishment of a TC-to the normal availability of the input to imitator firms in
                                                
30 The Promotion of newtorks in Chile involves subsidizing the manager of a network of similar firms with the
objective of improving access to Government incentives; enhancing bargaining power of the SME’s viz a viz
large firms;improving the pattern of division of labor among firms in the network; diffusing organizational
innovations, etc(Thanks to G. Crespi for information about these networks). These policies are not, in most
cases, identical or similar neither with pure user-producer networks nor with full- fledged networks of
innovators (or flexile specialization networks) discussed in the context of Industrial Districts (see Bianchi &
Bellini 1991) as alternatives to the Fordist, mass production model of organization. Such networks\network
promotion policies which have been discussed in the European context are akin to aspects of the overall
restructuring process proposed in this paper and not only to the preparatory stage of such a process as has
been the intention here. The similarities with the model of this paper are found first and foremost as regards
the imitator and laggard segments of the business secctor where restructuring requires the implmentation of
‘system effects’. For example, policies to promote the creation of new ‘networks of innovators’ include the
stimulation of collective institutions (“Service Centers” such as CITER estalished in Emilia Romagna in
1980   for new and weak companies in the textile and clothing sectors) to stimulate the creation, diffusion
and utilization of new technological and market information (e.g. trends in fashion designs and and training
to operate and use design workstations) and for overall coordination. In this paper these would correspond to
(hierarchical) level 2 organizations such as our Technology Centers whose function is to assist RBS of
imitators (and also of groups of laggards). Note that in the configuration shown in this paper the TC is32
Phase 2, thereby contributing to Ri in this phase. Ra also indirectly contributes to laggards
via the transformation of TC into M.
31
The mobilization and stimulation of these dynamic effects by policy is also represented in
the diagram (curved arrows with policy acronyms). Thus AIC reinforces the autonomous
effect of demand for the new input and leads to an earlier and more effective TC which in
turn, through S, contributes to Ri. Proactive Diffusion Policies (PD) undertaken by the same
TC will contribute to generate the demand D for the new input (Phases 2,3).
                                                                                                                                                     
created to complete the restructuring of advanced firms and thereater contribute to the restructuring of other
segments--a dynamic effect.  
31 Note that the establishment of a differentiated organized market (Lundvall 1985) contributes to Rl through
the stimulation of both S and D and not only through a pure supply effect. The reason for this is that the
specialized supplyers comprising the new sector both provide technical back-up to users and continuosly




FIGURE 1: DYNAMIC FACTORS & GOVERNMENT
POLICY IN RBS - THE FULL NSI TRANSITION CASE
Notation
direction of effect of Dynamic Factors
Supply, Demand Effects
Government (or TC) Policy
G = {Ha, Hi, SME, AIC, PD, MB}
Rj = Restructuring of Business Sector Segment J (J= a, i, e)
Ha = Horizontal Restructuring Policies (aimed at Advanced Firms)
Hi = Horizontal Restructuring Policies (aimed at Imitators)
SME = SME - Support scheme (aimed at Laggards)
PD = Pro-active Diffusion Policies
MB = Market Building Policies                   ;  M = the new market
























Overall,  the Figure represents both innovation system transition and the enhanced
embeddement of business firms associated with such transition.
4.2 Synthesis of Policy Implications
A number of potentially interesting implications follow  from the analysis.
1. The criticality of initial policies
Policies can be viewed as supporting or failing to support the materialization of dynamic
increasing returns to restructuring or alternatively to generate a cumulative process of
change, one engulfing increasingly wider segments of the BS. Thus small initial differences in
the appropiatness or in the  efficiency of policy , due to path dependency, may have very
significant long term implications. Also, abscence of policy when autonomous restructuring
is weak may fail to trigger NSI transition.
2. Successful initial policies build upon and reinforce the autonomous restructuring process
of advanced entrepreneurs. They generally  involve both horizontal and targeted programs.
Successful policies should initially be focused towards dynamic sectors (in our model, the
advanced segment of entreprenuers) who potentially may generate intangible and other
dynamic factors which promote cumulativeness of the business sector transition process i.e.
imitation by follower firms. This is consistent with the Evolutionary Theory presumption
that ‘imitation’ is a major mechanism of economic growth (Nelson and Winter 1982) and
with the fact that there are strong differences in the real world in the innovativeness of
enterprises
32. To materialize this strategy, horizontal policies should be implemented since
many restructuring problems are common to firms in different sectors and technologies
                                                
32 This is reflected emprirically in the Innovation Surveys run in several countries in the last 4 years. In the
Norwegian case when considering for example all manufacturing firms with more than 200 employees the
innovation survey shows that a small percentage of such firms account for the majority of new products
introduced in the 3 years before the surrvey was taken while about half of the firms have not introduced any
new product whatsoever(thanks to K. Smith for this observation; see also Nas1996). A related issue concerns
the notion of a strategic industry (Nelson 1984): this paper suggests than certain industries may play a
strategic role in the transition of national innovation systems (through restructuring experience spillovers)
without themselves necessarily being strategic-at least in the narrow sense of the term. The model of NIS
transition in this paper allows for differentiated enterprise categories based on the phase in which their
restructuring is initiated, rather than on sectoral characteristics. Further work should allow for structural
differences in “technology regime” as well(see Malerba & Orsenigo 1996 and Breschi & Malerba 1997).35
although the specifics may differ from case to case and because at least some learning and
some important spillovers straddle accross sector and technology boundaries. Such policies
are appropiate to stimulate the broad aspects of restructuring
33. Targeted policies, on the
other hand, focus on the specific  aspects of restructuring which means targeting an input \
technology of strategic importance for the economy. They are  necessary since full RBS
must involve both the general and  the specific aspects of the process.
3. Horizontal Policies will evolve with experience and could    contribute to  variety.
HTP comprise a chain or string of  interconnected programs supporting general aspects of
restructuring  whose  enterprise focus evolves  with  the restructuring  experience .  Thus
during  the successful innovation system  transition  case considered in this paper, a program
supporting imitator  firms  will come after a program directed to advanced \ innovator firms.
Its impact  will   depend on the experience  accumulated from the restructuring process
stimulated by the previous HTP program. Moreover, by focusing on different types of
firms and even on  different functions and organizational changes, the various programs play
a role both in  catering to variety and in stimulating it (firm differences are  partly
endogeneously  generated  by  the  restructuring process  which in turn is stimulated by
HTP). Variety is also promoted as a consequence of learning during implementation of a
particular HTP program: eventually we should expect a  set of different promotion schemes
one for each  sub- category of firm, state of core competencies & organizational capabilities
(Teubal 1996b).
34  
4. Targeted Policies stimulate institutions and infrastructure that perform both a demand
satisfaction function with respect to advanced firms and a demand anticipation (and market
building) function. viz a viz less sophisticated business sector segments.
                                                
33 Notice that focused horizontal policies in Phase 1 differ from a policy of picking winners or of supporting
National Champions, despite the fact that beneficiary firms are supposed to play a strategic role in business
sector restructuring (strategic in the sense of the previous footnote).
34 This will also involve less neutrality and more selectivity in  incentives. Thanks to Keith Smith for having
stimulated my thinking about the role of a specific  horizontal programs in stimulating variety. My
conclusion is that even in situations where a horizontal program is being substituted ,through learning, by a
set of targeted programs there would still be room for a downsized horizontal policy scheme  to allow  for
‘random’ or  ‘unexpected’ variety.36
In this model targeted policies involve either creation of a TC or subsequent implementation
of policies by such “intermediate organizations”. TC creation satisfies the needs of advanced
firms in Phase 1 and anticipates the “needs” of imitator firms in Phase 2. Similar
considerations hold in connection with market building policies undertaken in Phase 2 - they
partly respond to the contemporary needs of imitators, but on the other hand, they also
anticipate the needs of laggards (some of which are not yet aware of the need to restructure).
5. The effect of targeted policies is to embedd business firms into a more complex system
inolving new types of organizations and\or social institutions(indirect impact on RBS).
Embeddement through a new market has scope, depth and flexibility implications which
enables  enterprises-particularly imitators and laggards- to continuosly adapt in an
endogenous fashion in response to changes in the environment (provided they are not radical
changes). The process results from emergence of a new hierarchical level of organization in
the national system of innovation.Both self organization and  Government Policy might be
required.
35
6. Appropiate timing and coordinated policy deployment  are crucial
Due to cumulativeness of the processes of innovation system transition the timing of
policies is crucial. For example, too early application of  an SME- support scheme may be
wasteful and risks at being non effective since the restructuring possibilities of these firms
could be limited due to non-embeddement and to the dearth of spillovers from advanced
firms. Second, undue delay in the implementation of Phase 1 targeted policies, by failing to
                                                
35 The literature on regional systems and clusters also emphasizes the embeddeness attained by individual
firms e.g. Malmberg and Maskell (1996) talk about firms embedded in a networked structure of customers,
supplyers and institutions which both provide opportunities and exert pressures for knowledge accumulation.
The tradition represented by the above authors also emphasizes the importance of interactions and interactive
learning; of proximity in space (also for economies of agglomeration); and even of embeddement of the
regional system within an even wider system involving also cultural factors and other broader institutional
variables. While the role of market forces in the operation of the system is recognized there seems to be an
underemphasis in the role of markets as social institutions in generating enterprise embeddeness (i.e. greater
stability in the face of changes; continuos product and process improvements, flexibility etc). Another major
distinction with this paper (and with part of the industrial district and network of innovation literature) is the
emphasis here in the dynamics of system change rather than on (the static) characteristics of a successful
cluster or regional system. How did the Danish furniture industry evolve? It is clear that the story is more
complex than a simplistic analysis of Marshallian external economies would seem to imply, since
institutions to capture potential externalites must be allowed to arise endogeneously as part of the process.
Thus it may be important to make a distinction between hierarchical sysem effects--which help propel
enterprise restructuring during the transition period - and the embeddment feature which is then achieved
upon termination of this period.37
reinforce autonomous restructuring, may reduce spillovers and what can be profitably be
learned by other firms. It will also block the specific restructuring efforts of imitators. Thus
timing of policies and more than this, the balance and coherence between horizontal and
targeted ones (and between those aimed at different enterprise segments) are critical issues
determining whether or not a cumulative restructuring process will emerge.
5. Summary and Link with Diffusion Policies
The restructuring process described above which leads to a new national system of
innovation could be viewed as a multifaceted, cumulative process of diffusion  of new
technologies, new management and organizational routines\capabilities; and even of new
strategies of business enterprises. The process is close to Metcalfe’s broad view of the
diffusion of technology which -following Layton’s view of ‘technology’- includes artifacts,
skills and knowlege( Metcalfe 1988, 1994). This is a broader set of processes than those
underlying most artifacts’-focused  diffusion models. The knowledge (and, to some extent-
skill) aspect of diffusion in this paper is the cumulative learning to restructure process
which accompanies a successful transition to a more complex and open national system of
innovation. It plays one of the central roles in enhancing  the awareness,articulation of needs
and  absortion capabilities of enterprises in the business sector, both in regard to the
general(largely organizational) components of the diffusion process and in regard to the
specific, technological, component. The information sets facing the agents , which are
relevant for their adoption decisions,  are definitely not exogenously given  but depend
endogeneously on the diffusion process itself.
36
The process begins with advanced firms and proceeds gradually to engulf imitator and
laggard enterprises. By and large NSI policies--which are diffusion policies since system
transition, in this paper, is a process of diffusion of restructuring-- belong to two groups:
horizontal policies  and targeted policies. The former directly provide incentives to
enterprise restructuring and contribute to generate the knowledge which links the
                                                
36 The notion of ‘artifact’ in this model should include both new technology \inputs and new organizational
routines. It follows that the ‘knowledge’ aspect relates to the interface between  adopters and their
characteiristics on the one hand and the characteristics or configurations of the various kinds of technological
and organizational ‘artifacts’ on the other.38
restructuring  experience of advanced firms with those of imitators and laggards; while
targeted policies stimulate emergence of new collective organizations and technological
infrastructure  which supply novel inputs  for the specific aspects of enterprise
restructuring.
This diffusion policy  perspective to enterprise restructuring where both horizontal and
targeted programs are used to induce a  cumulative process of restructuring while also
generating critical ‘system effects’ seems to differ   from other perspective developed in
Europe during the nineties(see “Oslo Manual” in OECD 1992, Soete and Arundel 1993, the
Green Paper on Innovation -EC 1995). Soete & Arundel analyse  the main characteristics of
an integated and systemic view of innovation and diffusion processes and then proceed to
derive sets of relevant policies linked to each of these characteristics. Each set follows from a
particular feature of the innovation\diffusion process (Soete and Arundel op. cit. Table 4,
p.38). My contention is that additional insights might be obtained by utilizing a broad
‘diffusion of enterprise restructuring’ perspective such as the one presented here. I explain
by making reference to the cumulativeness aspect and to the uniqueness of each diffusion
process as raised by Soete and Arundel.
Cumulativeness of the Process.
This paper is based on a distinction between early experience  in diffusion (or in
restructuring) and emergence of a more or less codified body of knowledge  about this
process, one that could be easily and efficiently accessed and implemented by a variety of
other economic agents. Insufficient attention is given to the latter(both in Academic work
and in policy making) as if experience would be   gathered,classified and codified
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automatically there being no need to consider the  collective learning process itself.
37
Naturally this  is unwarranted particularly in cases where enterprise restructuring involves
numerous technologies,functions and organizational forms as well as a large variety of
different enterprise types. When a fragmented process of experience is not followed by
subsequent  knowledge  consolidation, it may fail to generate the cumulative
diffusion\restructuring process aimed at.
It follows that  ‘policy’ aimed at generating collective learning for cumulativeness in the
restructuring process should include a component which systematizes existing experience
and codifies it according to a broadly accepted terminology which is also readily recognized
by “users” (i.e. the enterprises poised to restructure see also Bianchi and Bellini op. cit.).In
reality most policy recomendations still have a neoclassical flavour which focuses on
incentives and effectively ignores learning particularly how the process of collective learning
is build up from an aggregation of individual experiences. Apparently they rarely look for
impacts beyond the firms actually supported. To my mind this gap should be traversed
before a structured and coordinated set of policy actions will emerge one which could trigger
the multifaceted process of enterprise restructuring and reinforce its diffusion.
38  
Uniqueness of the development\and diffusion processes of each innovation
A policy implication is the need to find a balance between a range of specific programs
supporting diversity and more general policies (Soete & Arundel op.cit.). This is achieved in
this paper by a mix betweeen horizontal and targeted policies which exploit the link between
the “innovation” aspect of firm restructuring (the autonomous restructuring of advanced
firms) and the “diffusion” aspect (subsequent restructuring by imitator enterprises and by
laggards). Moreover by focusing on the restructuring process of firms rather than on the
diffusion of a technology, issues concerning the timing and coordination of the various
policies can, in principle, be addressed explicitely.
                                                
37 In fact, the accumulation of experience from the progressive use of a new technology seems frequently to be
visualized as being similar in its automaticity to the enhanced efficiency attained in network technologies
through an increase in the number of users.
38 Despite this abscence of a well developed theory of collective learning  ignoring the issue of triggering
collective learning when discussing policy is not justified. Thus means should be taken to assure a ‘critical
mass’ of experience, as a necessary condition for collective learning. Moreover, codification requires
undertaking case study work and developing conceptual structures to integrate the variety of experiences.40
Horizontal Policies
Finally, our policy framework clarifies the nature and role of horizontal restructuring
policies (HRP) in the diffusion of enterprise restructuring. These play a significant role in
that they may trigger and reinforce collective learning about restructuring. Their role has
been  underestimated in the past due to the focus on specific technological
development\diffusion programs (given the inherent  specificities of technology).
39  HRP
stimulate adoption and diffusion of new “functions” such as R&D or design ; new
management  routines or organizational forms accross sectors and even technologies. They
may be of flexible application  i.e. they may cater to different restructuring needs of firms
even in the context of a single program
40; and, while open to  all firms, they are focused  at
each phase to a different segment of the business sector.
41. Finally, the main HTP programs
change along the transition process.
It is also important to emphasize the importance of horizontal programs for promoting
variety (Teubal 1997) and for ensuring the successul transformation of firms whose
characteristics are not detectable a- priori by policy makers (and which therefore would not,
at least in an early stage, be catered by a separate program). Fundamental uncertainty about
the sources of new variety would seem to justify the need for horizontal programs both in
respect to the restructuring of incumbent firms and for the promotion of entrepreneurship
and new start ups.
A major challenge of future work is to consider the policy implications of other sources of
variety among firms in the Business Sector e.g. related to economic sectors and core
technologies. This will undoubtedly alter the balance between horizontal and targeted
                                                
39 In previous work I mentioned the underemphasis given by neoclassical and evolutionary economists alike
on Horizontal Technology Policies (HTP). There seems to be a common reason for underemphasis of
horizontal policies, one that is probably misplaced once one recognizes both the fundamental uncertainty
surrounding innovation\diffusion and ignorance of policy makers.
40 Such a flexibility has characterized the New Technology (NT) Program for Northern Norway, a successful
regional restructuring program (Step, 1996). Thanks to K. Smith for having pointed out this feature.
41 Initial focusing of horizontal programs to an advanced or Schumpeterian segment of firms is a central feature
of the policy framework of this paper The NT program was directed to innovative firms only and in a second
phase a subset of focal firms was picked out for special treatment. It could be justified in terms of identifying
potential for generating dynamic effects and thereby generating the cumulative process mentioned above in
the text. Note that the shifting enterprise target also implies a change in the structure of the activities or
functions prromoted, in the incentives provided and in other related actions. I should also mention that
firms’ focusing within an horizontal pogram could be based on general criteria for participating in
Government Programs and thereby is consistent with programs which are  open to all fims. It should not be
confused with a policy of supporting national champtions.41
policies. The insights obtained may help bridge the gap between “theory” (in this case,
appreciative theory) and the practice and practical needs of industrial -technological policy
promoting the transition of National Systems of Innovation.
ANNEX 1; SUMMARY DESCRIPTIONS OF POLICIES
1 Horizontal Restructuring Policies (HRP)
1.1 Phase 1-aimed at Advanced Firms
Assumptions:  Awareness of need to restructure and fairly widespread R&D. Also the
beggining of a new strategic outlook in many firms and new forms of organizational learning.
Despite autonomous restructuring activity there are widespread institutional constraints and
market failures blocking effective and full implementation of the process.
Functional areas supported(one or more)
- Search and introduction of search function
- Enterprise R&D and product design
- Cooperative, precompetitive R&D
- Precision manufacturing and new process technology
- Export marketing
- Organizational  learning  and introduction of sophisticated new routines &
processes
- Generation of distinct, dynamic capabilities
- Links and Collaborations (Universities, Government Labs, Technology Centers;
other firms)
1.2 Phase 2- aimed at Potential Imitators42
Assumptions: Some awareness but lack of capabilities to undertake change. R&D is not
widespread; and pervasive market failures in innovation and in introduction of new routines.
Also, very strong failures in connection with the diffusion of new technology (and
associated routines)
Functional Areas Supported (one or more)
- Search
- Links with new external sources of technology
- Utilization of external consultants
- Links with Technology Centers and Universities
- Networking with other enterprises
- Technology Transfer and Absortion (including training)
- Product Design and  Enterprise R&D
- Organizational Learning (greater emphasis than for advanced firms, especially of
less sophisticated  capabilities)
1.3 Phase 3: aimed at Laggards (mainly SME’s)
- Major Functions only weakly covered in previous phases
Training,preparation of business plans, diffusion of basic managemnt techniques
(managing cash flows, inventories etc) and organizational routines.
- Consultancy
Stimulating the emergence of a specialized consultancy segment and market to help
articulate demand (importance of geographical and cultural affinity); promoting links
with consultants and with external sources of information and advice.
-  Networking with other enterprises43
- Enhanced support of technology transfer and absortion
Incentives, information, and technical back up.
- Special Financial aid (to compensate for inherent capital market imperfections)
2. Proactive Diffusion Policies (Specific new inputs)
- requires technical back-up to users
- The TC should identify and adapt right configurations of service for each user type
building demand through learning by interaction and adaptation)
- involves also strong incentives to use new technological services44
3. Market Building Policies
- involves building demand (see above) and building supply
- building supply  through training of new consultants, spinoffs of TC personell,
making  existing equipment available to consultants, etc.
- pursuing a positive social profit policy despite potentially negative private
profits .
4. Networking etc Policies (for Laggards and Imitators)
- Collaborative search for new information on markets and technology
- collaborative search for new orders and collective division of labor in producing 
commisioned orders
- collective transfer and adoption of new technology
- developing problem solving capabilities collectively
- provision of information, coordination and institutional help
-  incentives for creating and mantaining a Secretariat for each network.
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